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Municipal Law. Brandon v. City of Providence, 708 A.2d 893
(R.I. 1998). So long as a police officer acts with a reasonable strategy to help a person in need obtain emergency assistance, the officer's conduct will generally fall within the tort immunity
provided by Rhode Island General Laws section 9-1-27.
In Brandon v. City of Providence,' the Rhode Island Supreme
Court first interpreted Rhode Island General Laws section 9-1-27,
which grants police officers immunity from civil suit for any injuries which may arise in the course of rendering assistance to an
injured party, except for those injuries which arise from gross, willful or wanton negligence on the part of the officer. 2 The court
broadly interpreted the statute to protect officers from both rendering affirmative aid and securing the scene so that the victim may
receive aid.3
FACTS AND TRAVEL

Frank Brandon (Frank) was at the intersection of Hilton and
Bogman Streets in Providence on July 21, 1989 when he fell victim
to drive-by gunfire from unknown parties. 4 At approximately 9:30
p.m., shortly after the shooting, Providence police officer Steven
Moran (Moran) arrived at the scene and observed Frank sitting in
the passenger seat of a Camero, with his brother John Brandon
(John) at the wheel. 5 Frank was bleeding from a gunshot wound to
the stomach and waiting for John to drive him to a nearby
6
hospital.
Officer Moran forbade John to drive away, explaining that a
rescue squad, which the officer had notified immediately upon his
arrival, was on its way. 7 After John persisted, a struggle took
place between Officer Moran and John, during which the officer
removed the keys from the car's ignition.8 Another of Frank's
brothers, Rafael Brandon (Rafael), jumped onto Moran's back
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.

708 A.2d 893 (R.I. 1998).
Id. at 894.
See id.
See id. at 893.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id.
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while additional officers were arriving on the scene. 9 The officers
soon restrained both brothers, then attempted to aid Frank.' 0
Rescue personnel arrived within minutes and took over the administration of medical assistance to Frank." Soon thereafter,
Frank was taken by ambulance to the hospital where he was pronounced dead at 10:35 p.m. 12 The time of death was approximately one hour after the initial call for "shots fired" was placed to
13
Providence Police Department.
Olga Brandon (Olga), Frank's mother, filed suit alleging that
Frank's mortal blood loss was attributable to the length of time
during which the officers delayed John from driving Frank to the
hospital. 14 Superior Court Justice Williams granted summary
judgment to the city and Olga appealed.' 5
ANALYSIS AND HOLDING

The issue before the supreme court was whether the officers
could be held liable for Frank's death in the face of Rhode Island's
statutory immunity for its police officers provided by Rhode Island
General Laws section 9-1-27, which states in relevant part:
No member of any police force or fire department of the state
or any city or town... who while on duty and in the performance of that duty voluntarily and gratuitously renders emergency assistance to a person in need thereof... shall be liable
for civil damages for any personal injuries which result from
acts or omissions by the persons rendering the emergency
care, which may constitute ordinary negligence. This immunity does not apply to acts or omissions constituting gross,
16
willful, or wanton negligence.
Olga argued that this statute did not apply because the officers
were not rendering emergency assistance to Frank but rather were
preventing Frank from obtaining medical assistance. 17
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.

See id. at 893-94.
See id. at 894.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id.
Id. (quoting R.I. Gen. Laws § 9-1-27 (1956) (1997 Reenactment)).
See id. at 894.
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The supreme court held, however, that the totality of the circumstances surrounding the conduct of the officers on the evening
in question placed the officers within the statutory protection contemplated by the statute. "Although [Officer] Moran did not affirmatively render medical assistance," said the court in its per
curiam opinion, "Moran did secure the crime scene and did safeguard Frank's person to ensure he would in fact receive treatment
and would not be placed in any greater danger."' 8 The court also
noted that Moran and the other officers who arrived at the scene
did not know the identities of the individuals at the scene and the
circumstances of what had happened and that releasing Frank to
"those purporting to be friends or relatives" may have been even
more harmful to Frank. 19 Therefore, according to the court, "[iut
was not only reasonable but appropriate for Moran to secure both
20
the scene and Frank pending the arrival of rescue personnel."
The court noted that the immunity provided to police officers
by section 9-1-27 may be overcome by a showing of "gross, willful,
or wanton" negligence, but determined that Olga had not made out
such an allegation in her complaint. 21 Under such circumstances,
the court found no exception to the general immunity for police officers provided by section 9-1-27.22
CONCLUSION

In its first occasion to interpret the meaning of section 9-1-27
of the Rhode Island General Laws, which grants immunity from
civil liability to police and firefighters when rendering "emergency
assistance to a person in need thereof," the Rhode Island Supreme
Court provided a broad definition of emergency assistance. In
Brandon v. City of Providence, the court found that the actions of
police officers in securing a crime scene and preventing a crime victim from being moved until medical assistance arrived fell within
the ambit of the section. Thus, police officers appear to be immune
from civil liability under the statute so long as their conduct can be
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. See id.
22. See id.
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reasonably said to chart a course toward the ordered delivery of
emergency assistance to a victim.
Roger I. Roots
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Municipal Law. Pullen v. State, 707 A.2d 686 (R.I. 1998). Ordinarily, a town or a city has a duty to keep roads in good repair,
which includes maintaining sidewalks that are adjacent to the
roadway. However, under sections 24-8-6 and 24-8-9 of the Rhode
Island General Laws, the state is authorized to enter into contracts
with a city or town regarding the construction and maintenance of
state owned sidewalks within the town or city borders. When such
a contract is entered into, the town or city no longer has a duty to
keep the subject sidewalk safe for pedestrian travel; rather, the
state expressly assumes the responsibility for and the duty of
maintaining sidewalks located within town or city borders.
In Pullen v. State,' the Rhode Island Supreme Court determined whether a city has a duty to maintain a sidewalk that is
located within its borders, but which the state owns, constructed
and agreed to maintain. 2 Ordinarily, the city has the duty of maintaining sidewalks within its borders. 3 However, the state may expressly assume this duty, thereby relieving the city of it, by
executing a contract with the city regarding the construction and
4
maintenance of sidewalks within a city.
FACTS AND TRAVEL

On or about May 3, 1992, Cynthia Pullen (Pullen) tripped on a
raised portion of the sidewalk located along America's Cup Avenue
in Newport and fell against a cement planter, sustaining injuries
to her face and arm.5 The sidewalk upon which she tripped, and
the adjacent street, America's Cup Avenue, are owned by the State
of Rhode Island. 6 Prior to constructing the sidewalk, the state
signed a construction and maintenance agreement with the city of
1. 707 A.2d 686 (R.I. 1998).
2. Id. at 687.
3. See id. at 689; see also R.I. Gen. Laws § 24-5-1 (1956) (1997 Reenactment)
(placing upon municipality the duty to repair and amend its roadways); Barroso v.
Pepin, 261 A.2d 277, 280 (R.I. 1970) (interpreting this duty so as to include main-

taining sidewalks located within city borders).
4. See Pullen, 707 A.2d at 692; see also R.I. Gen. Laws §§ 24-8-6, -9 (1956)
(1997 Reenactment) (granting to the director of transportation the authority to

construct and maintain sidewalks).
5. See Pullen, 707 A.2d at 687.
6. See id. The sidewalk and America's Cup Avenue were both constructed in
1968. See id.
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Newport, whereby the state assumed full responsibility for main7
taining both roadway and the sidewalk.
The plaintiff filed a complaint in superior court on March 22,
1995, against the city of Newport, the State of Rhode Island, the
Long Wharf Mall Associates, and CIC-Newport Associates, Ltd.s
Her claim was that these parties were negligent in "failing to
maintain the sidewalk in a reasonably safe condition for pedestrian travel."9
On July 7, 1995, the city filed a motion for summary judgment,
arguing that because of the 1968 agreement, the state, not the city,
had a duty to maintain the sidewalk.' 0 The state also filed a motion for summary judgment, arguing that the city, pursuant to section 24-5-1 of the Rhode Island General Laws, had a statutory
obligation to maintain all sidewalks within its borders."
On May 20, 1996, the trial justice entered summary judgment
in favor of the city and denied the state's motion for summary judgment. 12 The plaintiff and the state then filed separate appeals to
the Rhode Island Supreme Court. 13
The only question on appeal was whether a city has a duty to
maintain a sidewalk that is located within its borders, but which
the state owns, constructed and agreed to maintain. 14 The plaintiff contended that, pursuant to statute, the city has an obligation
to maintain all sidewalks within its border, regardless of whether
the state owns and controls the sidewalk,' 5 and that a municipality could be held liable for injuries sustained if it failed to maintain
sidewalks in a reasonably safe condition. 16 Furthermore, she ar7. See id. The agreement contained no expiration date, and was signed, on
behalf of the state, by the state purchasing agent, the chief engineer for the department of transportation, and a then-assistant attorney general. See id.
8. See id. Long Wharf and CIC were subsequently dismissed, because they
had no ownership interest in or control over the sidewalk at issue. See id.
9. Id.
10. See id. at 688.
11. See id.; see also R.I. Gen. Laws § 24-5-1 (1956) (1997 Reenactment).
12. See Pullen, 707 A.2d at 688.
13. See id. The state later withdrew its appeal. See id.
14. See id.
15. See id.; see also R.I. Gen. Laws § 24-5-1 (1956) (1997 Reenactment) (setting forth the obligation to maintain sidewalks).
16. See Pullen, 707 A.2d at 688; see also R.I. Gen Laws § 24-5-13 (1956) (1997
Reenactment) (imposing liability upon municipality for personal injuries caused by
city's failure to keep sidewalks in a reasonably safe condition).
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gued that the city could not relieve itself of its duty to maintain by
17
assigning it to anyone else.
ANALYsis AND HOLDING

This appeal involved the interpretation of two competing sets
of statutes, sections 24-5-1 and 24-5-13 and sections 24-8-6 and
24-8-9 of the Rhode Island General Laws. ' 8 To resolve the issue in
this case, the court had to discern the legislative intent behind
these statutes, and had to construe them in the context of the entire statutory scheme, attributing to them a meaning most consistent with the statute's underlying policies.' 9
Section 24-5-1 imposes upon a town the obligation to maintain
all "highways" within its borders in a reasonably safe manner, and
section 24-5-13 imposes upon a town liability for failing to do 80.20
The term "highways" has been defined in case law to include "sidewalks."2 ' Were this the only statute in place regarding the maintenance of sidewalks, one could easily conclude that a city must
maintain all sidewalks within its borders, regardless of whether
the state or the town owns them. And, indeed, prior to the enactment of chapter 8, title 24, the state had delegated such "control
17. See id. The Plaintiff argued that the duty imposed by section 24-5-1 is
nondelegable. There is no language in that particular section which supports that
argument. See R.I. Gen. Laws § 24-5-1 (1956) (1997 Reenactment). However, in
arguing this, plaintiff relied upon the case of Child v. Greene, 155 A. 664 (R.I.
1931), where the Rhode Island Supreme Court held that a town was not relieved of
its duty to maintain a city sidewalk adjacent to a state highway simply because the
sidewalk is later adopted as part of the state highway system. Child, 155 A.2d at
665. However, the Child case was decided before sections 24-8-6 and 24-8-9 were
even enacted. See Pullen, 707 A.2d at 690. Furthermore, the court clarified the
nondelegable aspect of the statute by noting that it prohibits a town from hiring an
independent contractor to maintain sidewalks which the town is responsible for
maintaining; it does not prohibit the town from agreeing with the state that the
state will maintain state owned sidewalks. Id. at 691.
18. Sections 24-5-1 and 24-5-13 impose upon a town the obligation to maintain
roadways, whereas sections 24-8-6 and 24-8-9 grant the state the authority to
maintain roadways. The question in this case is whether the state relieves the
town of its duty under section 24-5-1 by expressly taking on that duty itself. See
id.
19. See Pullen, 707 A.2d at 688-89 (citing In re Kyle S., 692 A.2d 329,331 (R.I.
1998)).
20. See R.I. Gen. Laws §§ 24-5-1, -13 (1956) (1997 Reenactment).
21. See Pullen, 707 A.2d at 689; see also Barroso v. Pepin, 261 A.2d 277, 280
(R.I. 1970) (holding that a sidewalk and a roadway make up a highway).
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and maintenance of the state's main highways to cities and towns
pursuant to § 24-5-1."22
In 1902, however, the state decided to centralize control of the
state highways by giving back to the state supervision and control
over roads designated as part of the state highway system. 2 3 A
provision was made for the establishment of a state highway system,24 and a state board was established that would submit, to the
Legislature, comprehensive plans regarding highway construction,
relocation, and improvement. 25 After money was appropriated,
the board would then contract for the work to be done. 26 State
funds were allocated and subsequently distributed to cities and
27
towns which maintained and repaired state roads.
This new statutory framework raised questions as to who, a
town or the state, would be responsible for maintaining roadways.
In 1917, the Rhode Island Supreme Court held in Poolerv. Burton
that state roads are directly under the control of the state, and that
the state has the duty to repair them. 28 Fourteen years later, however, the Rhode Island Supreme Court decided Child v. Greene,
where it held that it was the duty of the state board to keep the
roads in good repair, as "no statute specifically relieved the town of
the obligation of maintaining sidewalks adjoining state roads or
imposed that duty upon another entity."2 9 The court came to this
conclusion because the statutory scheme at that time authorized
towns to construct sidewalks adjacent to state roads; the court felt
the only natural statutory interpretation required the town to
30
maintain such sidewalks.
However, four years after the Child decision, the Legislature
enacted the predecessor to the statutes at issue in this case, sections 24-8-6 and 24-8-9, which authorized the director of transpor22. Pullen, 707 A.2d at 689. The state must establish and maintain public
highways. "Supervision and control over public highways . . . may be exercised
directly by the state or delegated to subordinate governmental agencies, such as
municipalities, as the Legislature deems fit." Id.
23. See id. at 689-90.
24. See id. at 690 (citing Pooler v. Burton, 100 A. 465, 466 (R.I. 1917)).
25. See id.
26. See id. (quoting 1902 R.I. Pub. Laws ch. 982, § 5).
27. See id.
28. See id.; see also Pooler, 100 A. at 465 (R.I. 1917) (holding that establishment of state highway system caused the state to have control over state roads).
29. Pullen, 707 A.2d at 690 (emphasis added) (citing Child, 155 A. at 664).
30. See id.
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tation to construct sidewalks along state roads, and empowered
the director to maintain them.3 1 This statute has not changed
much through the years, and is now codified in sections 24-8-6 and
24-8-9.32 In this case, the court concluded that, besides authorizing the director of transportation to construct and maintain sidewalks as part of the state highway system, these new statutes also
authorize the state to enter into contracts with a town or a city,
thereby relieving the town of its duty to maintain such state owned
sidewalks within the town or city borders.3 3
The State of Rhode Island entered into its contract with the
city of Newport pursuant to these new provisions. 3 4 Pursuant to
the contract, the state agreed to "construct and maintain the Memorial Boulevard Extension in the city of Newport as part of the
state highway system." 35 Furthermore, the state also agreed to
"'be responsible for the maintenance of the entire highway and appurtenances with the exception of the Agency's facilities . . .
[which] facilities includ[e] sewer, water, drainage, and fire alarm
systems.'" 36 In the instant case, the court noted that it is "highly
unlikely.., that the Legislature intended to require municipalities
to maintain a state-constructed sidewalk after the state has contracted to maintain the sidewalk pursuant to its statutory author-

31, See id.
32. See id. Rhode Island General Laws section 24-8-6 provides:
Authority for sidewalks and curbs.-The director of transportation shall
have the power and authority to make, lay in and upon, and construct
sidewalks, including curbs, adjacent to and along either or any one side or
both sides of any state road, now constructed, in the process of construction, or to be constructed, which in his or her opinion and judgment require sidewalks and curbs for pedestrian travel.
Id.
Section 24-8-9 provides:
Regulations of sidewalks and curbs.-The director of transportation shall
have the power and authority to alter, to maintain, to keep in good condition, to remove ice and snow therefrom, to remove posts, steps and any
other obstructions therein, to regulate the placement, structure, and alteration of curbs constructed adjacent to state roads.
R.I. Gen. Laws § 24-8-9 (1956) (1997 Reenactment).
33. See Pullen, 707 A.2d at 691.
34. See id.
35. Id.
36. Id. (citing agreement between the city and state).
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ity."3 7

Therefore, the state, not the city of Newport, was
responsible for maintaining the sidewalk upon which Pullen fell. 38
CONCLUSION

Ordinarily, a municipality has an obligation to maintain all
sidewalks within its borders. However, Rhode Island General
Laws sections 24-8-6 and 24-8-9 authorize the state to enter into
contracts with municipalities regarding the construction and
maintenance of state roads and sidewalks, thereby relieving the
municipality of its duty to maintain said roads and sidewalks.
When such a contract is entered into, the state expressly assumes
the responsibility for and duty of maintaining the sidewalks
specified.
Christine M. Fraser

37. Id.
38. See id. at 692. The court also dismissed plaintiffs final claim that the city
assumed responsibility for maintaining a sidewalk by doing so in the past. The
court held that section 45-15-11 of the Rhode Island General Laws expressly states
that "[n]o work done by any city or town, upon any way or street, shall constitute
or be any evidence of an acceptance of the way or street by the city or town, nor
shall it in any way change the status of the way or street. .. ." Id.

